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Abstract  
In this paper we apply a simple macro model to explore and evaluate certain optimal 
monetary policy rules for China's economy. To be more consistent with the central bank 
(the People's Bank of China)'s behaviour, we use money supply as a monetary policy 
instrument rather than the commonly used interest rate. Policy rules are optimal in terms of 
minimizing the predetermined loss functions, and the parameters of these rules are 
determined by stochastic simulation. Different forms of policy rule and loss function are 
considered, especially for exchange rate volatility and money supply volatility. The 
optimality of monetary policy rules is evaluated by comparing the shifts of policy frontiers. 
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The profession of monetary policy analysis in the past decade has extensively focused on 
modeling the central bank's behavior through monetary policy rules and their performance. 
Taylor (1993) proposed a simple interest rate rule to describe the behavior of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve between 1987 and 1992. Since Taylor’s paper, there has been much 
  1interest in evaluating the optimality of these rules and the robustness of them to different 
macro models. The policy rule is optimal in terms of minimizing a predetermined loss 
function. Although the choice of the loss function is often subjective, most researchers 
define the loss function as a squared deviation of the target variable from its target level. If 
we target several macroeconomic variables instead of one, then different weight can be 
assigned to each target.  
 
There are numerous studies that have considered the policy rules for different loss functions. 
Among these, Fair and Howrey (1996) examine monetary policy from an optimal control 
perspective. They assume that Federal Reserve Bank want to minimize a true loss function 
that targets both inflation and unemployment. Optimal values of the policy instruments (i.e. 
interest rate or monetary supply) are obtained by minimizing this true loss function in five 
different models. They also studied the effects of changing the loss function to target 
inflation alone, unemployment alone, nominal growth alone, and real growth alone. They 
mainly used the optimal control method to solve for the optimal instrument values, 
although they mentioned stochastic simulation method as an alternative to determine the 
optimal policy rules. Some recent influencing works include McCallum (1988, 1999), 
which suggest using multiple models to explore the robustness of policy rules, and Levin, 
Wieland and Williams (1999, 2003), which aim to find out the policy rules that work well 
across a wide range of structural models, that is, rules that are robust to model uncertainty. 
They find that simple policy rules that respond to the deviation of inflation from its target 
and the output gap perform nearly as well as more complicated rules in four models of the 
US. Economy. Their method is to compute the inflation-output volatility frontier of each 
model for alternative specification of interest rate rule, then evaluate robustness to model 
uncertainty by taking the rules that perform well in one model and measure their 
performance in each of the other three models. Among all the simple policy rules they 
investigated, the performance of the rules incorporating a high degree of interest rate 
smoothing dominate the others.  
 
In constructing the monetary policy rules for an open economy, Ball (1999) uses a small 
open model to assess the role of the exchange rate in a monetary policy rule. Ball shows 
  2that adding the exchange rate to simple policy rules can improve macroeconomic 
performance in his model. However, it could be questioned whether this result is robust to 
other models. Taylor (1999), after simulating his multi-country model, finds that the rule 
proposed by Ball often creates more instability than the basic Taylor rule. 
 
However, most studies on the monetary policy rules have involved models of developed 
countries like U.S. Few studies have been done to evaluate these types of rules in models of 
developing countries, such as China. This paper fills that gap by investigating the 
performance of several monetary policy rules in a simple model for China's economy.  
 
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to determine the optimal monetary policy rules for 
China. By conducting this analysis, we do not intend to assert that the central bank of China 
would have been or has been following certain monetary policy rules to minimize any loss 
function and stabilize the economy. In fact, even the US Fed has never admitted that its 
monetary policy followed any policy rules, even though its policy rules have been 
estimated and evaluated extensively. The point of our exercise – as of other such studies – 
is to see if the monetary policy actually pursued by the central bank can be captured and 
evaluated satisfactorily by certain policy rules and loss functions.  
 
Before any attempt to evaluate the policy rules, the first question we need to solve is which 
policy instrument to use, monetary supply or interest rate? In some early studies, Poole 
(1970) considered the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments between interest rate 
and money supply in an IS-LM model. If the aim is to minimize the squared deviation of 
the real output from its target value, he showed that the choice of the optimal instruments 
depends on the variances of the error terms in the IS curve and LM curve, the covariance of 
the two error terms and the size of the parameters of the model. Fair (1988) used stochastic 
simulation and U.S. econometric model to examine the optimal choice of monetary policy 
instruments. His result is that U.S. Fed’s choice of using the interest rate as its instrument 
can be justified on the basis of Poole’s analysis.  
 
  3When we try to answer this question concerning China's economy, we should consider the 
fact that China is still in the process of its transition from a planned economy to market 
economy. The central bank is learning how to stabilize the economy using market-oriented 
monetary policies instead of the old-fashioned direct instructions. We also should keep in 
mind that economic entities like individuals and firms are in the process of learning how to 
respond to the change of the interest rate by adjusting their consumption, saving and 
investment activities. Although it seems that most industrialized countries mainly use the 
interest rate as the policy instrument, it is still possible that an old-fashioned policy 
instrument like money supply (M2) could be more efficient than the popular instrument like 
interest rate in China, if there is a stronger relation between monetary supply and the 
ultimate objectives of the policy than the relation between interest rate and those objectives. 
 
Our main objective is to find out the best policy reaction functions that minimize the loss 
functions of the central bank using the stochastic simulation method. We want to explore 
the difference between the simple form policy rules and more complicated policy rules. We 
also attempt to determine how the change of the central bank’s loss function will affect the 
performance of different policy rules. Most researchers define the loss function as a 
weighted sum of the squared deviations of the target variables from theirs target levels. In 
our baseline case, we assume that central bank only targets the output gap and the inflation. 
Since export plays an important role in the economic growth of China, the central bank 
would prefer a stable exchange rate
1 and give some weight to the volatility of exchange rate 
in its loss function. We will examine how this extra consideration affect the performance of 
policy rules compared with the baseline case. Another extension of the loss function is to 
put the volatility of the monetary supply into consideration since we believe that a large 
fluctuation of money supply is not feasible and acceptable to the central bank. 
 
Our second objective is to do a historical analysis of China central bank’s monetary policy 
during the period of 1995 to 2003. We compare the performance of our optimal policy rule 
to the actual policy adopted by the central bank, and identify any difference between them. 
                                                           
1 The exchange rate regime in China is considered fixed and pegging to U.S. dollar, even though it is called "Managed 
Float" by the monetary authority.  On July 21 2005, the People's Bank of China announced a 2% appreciation of RMB 
with respect to U.S. dollar and promised to adjust exchange rate   based on a broader basket of currencies.  
  4Our main conclusion is that the optimal policy rule for the central bank of China is to adjust 
the growth rate of money supply to the lagged money supply and the deviations of the 
inflation, output gap, and exchange rate from their respective target levels.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the 
monetary policy conduct of the central bank of China. Section 3 describes the models on 
which our policy evaluation will be based. Also, it defines the general form of the policy 
rules and the loss functions of the central bank. Section 4 illustrates the procedures to find 
out the optimal policy by using the stochastic simulation method. Section 5 shows the 
estimated macro model and simulation results. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the 
further extension. 
 
2.  Monetary Policy Conduct of Central Bank of China 
China's reform on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy has made a dramatic 
progress during the last 20 years, with credit ceilings
2 eliminated, required reserves system 
reformed and open market operations strengthened, China's monetary policy basically 
finished the transition process from the direct control to the indirect market-orientated 
regulation. 
An important symbol of the reform of the transmission mechanism is the evolution of the 
intermediate target of the monetary policy. During the period of planned economy, China 
did not define any explicit intermediate targets for monetary policy. Discretion played a 
significant role in the policy decision. Since 1994, the central bank of China began to adopt 
money supply as an intermediate target and promulgate M0 (currency in circulation), M1 
(narrow money) and M2 (broad money) indicators. In the meanwhile, open market 
operation becomes the primary channel to control the monetary base and monetary supply. 
The main task of the central bank is to set an appropriate growth rate of the monetary 
supply so that the inflation rate is within the preferred level and the predetermined GDP 
growth rate can be achieved.  
 
                                                           
2 Credit ceiling is a kind of direct instructions from the central bank that limit the loans that the commercial banks can 
granted to the firms.  
  5From 1991 to 1995, China achieved an average annual GDP growth rate of 12 percent. Yet 
at the same time it also experienced serious inflation, with the consumer price index rising 
at an annual average rate of 12.9 percent, and even reaching a peak of 24.1 percent in 1994. 
To curb the inflation, the central bank adopted a tight monetary policy by reducing the 
growth rate of the money supply. The growth rate of M2 hit the peak in 1994 and dropped 
year by year after 1995. It fluctuated within the range of 10%-20% since 1997(see Figure 
1). As the result of the tight monetary policy, the consumer price index plunged to 2.8 
percent in 1997. In the meanwhile, China still maintained a 7-9 percent annual economic 
growth rate during the period 1997-2004. The tight monetary policy played a significant 
role in curtailing inflation. 
 
Most of the developed countries used monetary supply as the policy instrument in the 
1970’s and 80’s. Nowadays, interest rate has replaced the monetary supply and becomes 
the major policy instrument adopted by the central banks. However, interest rate currently 
has not been chosen to be the major intermediate target in China due to the fact that interest 
rate hardly accurately reflects the demand and supply of the funds since the interest rates 
are not determined by the market. Although an interest rate marketization is already on the 
schedule of the central bank, there is still a long way to go before we can treat the interest 
rate as a fully-fledged policy instrument. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the central 
bank totally ignore the interest rate. In 1998, in the face of the adverse impact of the Asian 
financial crisis, the central bank cut the interest rates for seven times to boost the domestic 
demand and ensure a sustainable economy growth, which indicates that the central bank of 
China is giving more weights to the interest rate instrument.   
 
(Insert Figure 1 here.) 
 
To formally justify our choice of monetary supply as the policy instrument, we perform a 
Granger causality test to show that the money supply growth rate has a greater impact on 
the GDP gap than the interest rate does. The results in table 1 evidently indicate that the 
money supply granger causes the GDP gap while the interest rate does not.  
 
  6(Insert Table 1 here.) 
        
Based on the history of monetary policy conduct of central bank of China and results we 
obtained from the causality test, we believe the money supply is still a more appropriate 
policy instrument for China’s economy. We will use the money supply as the policy 
instrument in the following sections.    
 
3.  Model Description, Loss Functions and Policy Rules 
 
3.1 The Simple Stochastic Macro Model 
Since the study on the macroeconomic model of China is very limited, the model we used 
here to evaluate the monetary policy is highly stylized. There are only three equations in 
our models: the first one describes aggregate demand, the second describes aggregate 
supply and the third one determines the exchange rate. 
  
(1)  yt = αmt-1 – βet-1 + εt,    εt = ρ1εt-1 + µ1t 
 
(2) πt = δyt-4 – λet-1 + ηt,      ηt = ρ2ηt-1 + µ2t
 
(3) et = – θmt-1 + νt,            νt = ρ3νt -1 + µ3t
 
where yt  is the output gap at time period t; mt =100(Mt –Mt-4), Mt is the log of the money 
supply, then   is four quarter growth rate of the money supply; e t m t  is the log of the real 
effective exchange rate( an increase of et means appreciation); πt is the inflation rate at time 
t . We assume the error terms εt, ηt, νt follow AR(1) process
3, and µ1, µ2, µ3 are white noise 
shocks.  All parameters are positive.  
 
                                                           
3 If we estimate equation (1)-(3) using usual OLS without the consideration of AR (1) in the error terms, the 
DW statistics are 0.56, 0.45,0.42 respectively, which indicates a strong serial correlation in the error terms. 
OLS is no longer BLUE in the presence of serial correlation. Even more importantly, the usual OLS standard 
errors and test statistics are not valid. Hence, to solve this problem, we apply the same method as in 
Wooldridge (2003). A feasible GLS estimation with AR (1) errors is applied, where the DW statistics become 
2.13, 1.48, 1.69,respectively. The GLS estimator turns out to be BLUE and the t statistics from the 
transformed equation are valid.  
  7All these three equations can also be written in a partial difference form. For example, 
Equation (1) can be written as: 
 
(1')  (yt  – ρ1yt -1) =α(mt-1 – ρ1mt -2) –β(et-1 – ρ1et -2)+ µ1t
 
Equation (1) describes the aggregate demand. The GDP gap at time t depends on the lagged 
growth rate of the money supply and lagged real effective exchange rate. Equation (2) is an 
open economy Phillips curve. The inflation rate at time t is determined by the four periods 
lagged GDP gap and the lagged real effective exchange rate.  Equation (3) shows the link 
between the monetary supply and the exchange rate. The intuition here is that an increase in 
monetary supply will lead to depreciation. 
 
The central bank can control the inflation through two channels: First, a monetary 
contraction at time period t reduces output gap at time period t+1 and thus inflation at time 
t+5.  Second, a monetary contraction at time t also leads to an appreciation at time t+1, 
which helps to curb the inflation in two ways: on one hand, an appreciation reduces the cost 
of imported goods, thus reduces the inflation directly; on the other hand, an appreciation 
will lower the GDP gap, thus curbs the inflation indirectly through Phillips curve. 
 
3.2 The Loss functions and the policy rules 
 
“The objective of China's monetary policy is to maintain the stability of the currency value 
and the economic growth,” quoted from ‘China's Monetary Policy: Retrospect and 
Prospect’ (2001), “Maintaining the stability of the RMB currency value means internally 
retaining the stability of the general price index and externally retaining the stability of 
RMB (Chinese Currency)'s real effective exchange rate.”  
 
This monetary policy report also indicates that the central bank of China believes a rise of 
less than 3 percent in the price level should be regarded as price stability. The stability of 
real effective exchange rate is considered as a prerequisite for a country to maintain an 
international balance of payments. The supply-demand relation on the foreign currency 
market could cause drastic fluctuations of the exchange rate. In particular, in China, a 
  8country whose foreign currency market is far from mature, permitting RMB exchange rates 
to fluctuate freely is detrimental to the real economy. The interference of the central bank 
on the foreign exchange market irons out the drastic fluctuations in the nominal exchange 
rates and maintains the stability of the long-term real exchange rates.  
 
Like the central banks of most industrialized countries, the central bank of China also 
thinks of the stabilization of the currency value and the output as the major objectives of 
the monetary policy. In the meanwhile, the central bank explicitly expresses its concerns 
about the stabilization of the real effective exchange rate. If we define the central bank’s 
loss function as a weighted sum of the squared deviations of the target variables from their 
target levels, then the loss function of central bank of China is as follows:  
 
(4) L = E[(y – y*)
2] + aE[(π – π*)
2] + bE[(e – e*)
2] + cVar(m) 
 
Where y is the output gap, the preferred output gap is set to be zero, that is, y* = 0; π  is the 
inflation rate, and the target level of the inflation rate π* = 3%; eis the yearly percentage 
change of the real effective exchange rate, we assume the central bank dislikes both the 
appreciation and the depreciation of the currency, so e* is set to be zero. m is the growth 
rate of money supply. The weight on the output stabilization is normalized to 1, a, b and c 
are the weights the central bank gives to the stabilization of the inflation rate, the exchange 
rate and the policy instrument respectively. This is the most general form of the loss 
function. The other forms of the loss function are just special cases of this general form.  
 
We assume the central bank’s policy rule has the following form: 
 
(5)  mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1 
 
The money supply   is determined as a linear function of the lagged money supply  , 
the deviation of the lagged four-quarter inflation rate π
t m 1 − t m
t-1 from its target level π*, lagged 
output gap yt-1 and lagged real exchange rate et-1. The inflation target π* is set to be 3%. 
Equation (5) is also called the policy reaction function. This is the most general and 
complicated function form. The simpler rules are just the special cases of this general form.  
 
  9The optimal monetary policy rule is obtained by choosing the optimal parameters of policy 
reaction function so that the value of the loss function defined by equation (4) is minimized.  
 
4.  Procedures of Stochastic Simulation 
 
Policy rules are designed to deal with the stochastic shocks to the economy. An optimal 
policy rule is the one that smoothes the fluctuations caused by the shocks. Within the 
framework of stochastic simulations, a variety of shocks are imposed on the model. These 
shocks are taken at random from a particular distribution and are repeatedly applied to the 
model. Hence the deviations of the target variables from their target levels can be 
calculated, which is the key step to measure the loss function of the central bank. 
 
In our model, the error terms εt, ηt, νt can be treated as the shocks which are generated via 
the AR(1) processes in the corresponding equations (1)-(3).  The innovation terms µ1t, µ2t, 
µ3t are taken from three i.i.d. normal distributions N(0, σi). The variance σi can be estimated 
using the residuals after the estimation of equation (1)-(3).
4
 
We first give initial values to all the parameters in the policy reaction function (equation (5)) 
and we want to calculate the value of the loss function under this policy rule by running a 
stochastic simulation. At time period t, after drawing the random shocks εt, ηt, νt, , the 
values of the yt, πt, et can be solved in the model
5, then the policy instrument mt can be 
calculated if all the parameters in the equation (5) are already chosen. At time t+1, another 
three shocks are drawn and we can solve for all the endogenous variables and the 
instrument variable as we did in time period t. After repeating this procedure for all the 
time periods, we obtain yt,  πt,  et for all the t. This is merely a deterministic simulation for 
the given values of the error terms. We call this a ‘trial’. Another trial can be made by 
drawing a new set of εt, ηt, νt  for all the time periods. Each trial will generate an estimate of 
the target variables for all the time period. We can do as much trials as desired. Since we 
runs a simulation on a 3 equations model over 36 time periods, we need to draw 3 error 
terms for 36 times for each trial. 
                                                           
4 The estimated variance of µ1t, µ2t, µ3tare 0.624, 1.608, 0.0004 respectively. 
5 When solving the model for the first four periods (1995:1-1995:4), we use the lagged information (1994:1-1994:4).    
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Let yit,  πit,  eit denote respectively the value of y,  π,  e at time period t of ith trial. Then the 
mean squared deviation of the target variable from their target levels can be calculated 
using the following formula: 
 














2 * 1 1
 
 
where T denotes the number of the time periods we run the simulation, N denotes the 
number of the trials taken, y* is the target level. This formula also applies to πit and eit. 
 
The value of the loss function defined in equation (4) then can be measured by the 
weighted sum of the MSDs.  
 
(7)   L = MSD(y) + a MSD(π) + b MSD(e) + c Var (m) 
 
The above-mentioned procedures are used to calculate the value of the loss function for one 
set of the chosen parameters of the policy reaction function. To find out the optimal policy 
rule, we will keep changing the parameters of the policy rule until we reach the 
minimization of the loss function.
6
 
5.  Estimation and Simulation Results 
 
In this section, we will apply the stochastic simulation to our estimated model to determine 
the optimal policy rules. Our target is to find out the parameters of the policy reaction 
function (equation 5) to minimize the value of the loss function of the central bank 
(equation 4).  
 
Firstly, the estimation results of the simple macro model, using China's data for the sample 
period 1995:1-2003:4, are shown below. Parameters estimates are obtained by using a 
Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression. (Absolute values of t-statistics are given in parentheses.) 
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(1a)  yt = 0.216mt-1 – 0.96et-1 + εt,                          εt = 0.871εt-1 + µ1t
                 (2.51)         (2.32) 
 
(2a) πt = 234.036 + 1.036yt-4 – 50.218et-1 + ηt,      ηt = 0.703ηt-1 + µ2t
                   (5.05)      (2.94)        (4.93) 
 
(3a) et = 4.707 – 0.00756mt-1 + νt,                         νt = 0.78νt -1 + µ3t
                (108.77)    (3.56) 
 
As described in Section 4, after applying the stochastic simulation on our estimated model, 
we can calculate the variable volatilities and the loss function according to Eq. (6) and (7). 
Obviously, our results will depend on the choice of the a, b and c, the relative weights 
given to the inflation, exchange rate and the money supply volatilities
7. Instead of listing all 
the results for different choices, we use a policy frontier that can trace out all the best 
obtainable combinations of the inflation and output volatilities in an inflation-output 
volatility space.  
 
Before moving to the details, we observe huge differences between the volatilities of the 
output, inflation, exchange rate and money supply. Table 2 shows the historical volatilities 
of these four variables over the period 1995:1- 2003:4. The volatilities of the inflation and 
money supply dominate the value of the loss function. For example, a double of the 
volatility of the output only causes an increase of 4.11 in loss function while an 11.6% 
increase of the volatility of inflation is enough to cause the same increase in loss function. 
Even we give the same weight to output and inflation volatility in the loss function (i.e. 
a=b=1), the volatility of inflation still influences the loss function much more. In our 
calculation of the loss function, we use a relative volatility, which is defined as the 
percentage of the historical volatility. For instance, suppose the output and inflation 
volatilities we obtained via stochastic simulation are 3 and 30 respectively, the relative 
volatilities used to calculate the loss function are 0.73 (3/4.11) and 0.85(30/35.35) 
respectively.  
 
(Insert Table 2 here.) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 The minimization is reached by using a Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method. The details can be found in 
Greene,W.H.’s Econometric Analysis (4
th editon), Chapter 5 .  
7 We use MSDs defined in section 4 to measure the volatilities.  
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5.1 Consider  Only  the  volatility  of  the  output  and  inflation  in  the  loss  function            
(b = 0, c = 0) 
5.11 General reaction function form: mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1 
 
We start by considering only the volatility of the output gap and the inflation in the loss 
function. Table 3 shows the parameters of the optimal policy rules and the relative 
volatilities of the output gap, inflation, exchange rate and money supply obtained under the 
optimal policy rules. The column ‘loss’ shows the value of the loss function under the 
optimal policy rules; the column ‘actual loss’ shows the value of the loss function 
calculated using the historical volatilities. If the value of ‘loss’ is less than the value of the 
‘actual loss’, it indicates our optimal rule outperforms the actual policy adopted.    Note that 
historical volatilities are normalized to one. So, a less than one value of the relative 
volatility indicates an improvement for that target variable, vice versa. For example, in the 
case of a = 0, MSD(y) = 0.32, MSD(π) = 1.76, which means the volatility of the output 
under the optimal policy rule only accounts for 32% of the historical volatility; meanwhile, 
the volatility of the inflation surge to 176% of the historical volatility. It is not a surprise to 
see this result, since we assume the central bank does not care about the inflation by 
assuming a = 0. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here.) 
 
When we increase the weight given to the inflation by increasing a, the optimal policy 
tends to respond to the inflation more aggressively and react to the output gap more 
tenderly. The relative volatility of the inflation drops from 1.76 to 0.67; meanwhile, the 
relative volatility of the output increases from 0.32 to 2.03. Although all the policy rules 
outperform the actual policies adopted in terms of value of the loss function, however, the 
volatilities of the money supply exceed the historical volatilities in all cases, which 
indicates that the central bank actually adopted a more smooth policy with a less fluctuation 
of the money supply.  
 
  13We also observe that a feasible range of the weight the central bank gives to the inflation is 
from 1 to 3. If the weight is less than 1, the inflation volatility exceeds the historical 
volatility; if the weight is more than 3, the output volatility surpasses the historical 
volatility.  
 
5.12 Special reaction function form: not consider the exchange rate 
mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1 (ρ = 0) 
 
If the central bank does not consider the exchange rate in the policy rule, that is, ρ  is set to 
be zero, the results are shown in table 4. We observed that the values of the loss function 
obtained are worse than those in the table 3. Both the volatility of output and the volatility 
of the inflation are larger than the corresponding values in table 3.  
 
(Insert Table 4 here.) 
 
Figure 2 clearly shows the impact of the consideration of the exchange rate on the 
performance of the policy rules. Obviously, a consideration of the exchange rate in the 
policy rules function improves the performance the policy rules since the policy frontier of 
considering the exchange rate is closer to the origin.  
 
We also observe the policy frontiers are convex, which can be explained by the trade off 
between the volatility of the output and the volatility of the inflation when the central bank 
chooses different a. When a is small, i.e., the central bank does not care about the volatility 
of inflation, a small sacrifice of the output can gain a large improvement in the volatility of 
inflation. The marginal benefit of increasing a  is the reduction of the volatility of the 
inflation, which becomes smaller and smaller when a increases.    
 
(Insert Figure 2 here.) 
 
5.13 Special reaction function form: only consider the output and the inflation 
mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1 (ρ = 0, γ = 0) 
 
If the central bank does not consider the lagged money supply and the exchange rate in the 
policy rule, that is, ρ  and γ  are set to be zero, the results are shown in table 5. We observe 
  14that the values of the loss function obtained are much worse than those in the table 3 and 
table 4. None of the rules can outperform the actual rules adopted. We also observe that the 
omission of the lagged money supply from the reaction function affects the volatility of 
output more than the volatility of the inflation.  
 
(Insert Table 5 here.) 
 
Figure 3 clearly shows the impact of the omission of the lagged money supply on the 
performance of the policy rules (Compare table 5 and table 4, both of them do not consider 
the exchange rate so that we can see the impact of lagged money supply more clearly). 
Obviously, an omission of the lagged money supply from the reaction function worsen the 
performance of policy rules by a lot since the policy frontier of not considering the lagged 
money supply lies much farther away from the origin.   
 
(Insert Figure 3 here.) 
 
 
5.2 Add the volatility of the money supply into the loss function ( c is not equal to 0) 
mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1  (c = 0.5) 
 
In section 5.1, we already find out several optimal policy rules which can beat the 
performance of the actual policy adopted in terms of both the volatility of output and 
volatility of inflation (see rows in bold). However, the volatilities of money supply exceed 
the historical volatility by a lot, which indicates that the central bank may hate the volatility 
of the money supply and prefer a more smooth policy.  
 
To keep the volatility of money supply in the desirable range, we include the volatility of 
the money supply to the loss function. When we set the weight equal to 0.5, we observe 
that the volatilities of the money supply obtained are within the acceptable range, so c= 0.5 
is an appropriate choice. If we give more weight (ex. c=1) to the money supply, the 
volatility of the money supply obtained only accounts for about half of the historical 
volatility. 
 
 (Insert Table 6 here.) 
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All the policy rules outperform the actual policies adopted in terms of value of the loss 
function; meanwhile, both the output volatility and the inflation volatility are less than the 
corresponding historical volatilities when a ranges from 1 to 2. In this range, the volatilities 
of the money supply are also close to the historical volatilities. 
 
In Figure 4, we use the policy frontier shift to clearly show the impact of the constraint on 
the money supply on the volatility of the inflation and the output. Obviously, a constraint 
on the volatility of the money supply eases the fluctuation of the money supply at the cost 
of worsening the performance of the policy rules, but just a little.  
 
(Insert Figure 4 here.) 
 
5.3 Add the volatility of exchange rate into the loss function (b is not equal to zero) 
mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1  (b = 2 , c = 0.5) 
 
In the following experiment, we assume the central bank give a large weight (c=2) to the 
volatility of the exchange rate in the loss function so that the volatility of the exchange rate 
can be reduced to approximately half of the historical level.  
 
The results are shown in table 7. Notice that volatilities of the output are worse than the 
historical volatilities in all cases, which indicates a tradeoff between the volatility of the 
exchange rate and the volatility of the output. 
 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
In Figure 5, we use the policy frontier shift to clearly show the impact of the constraint on 
the exchange rate on the volatilities of the inflation and the output. Obviously, a constraint 
on the volatility of the exchange rate eases the fluctuation of the exchange rate at the cost of 
worsening the performance of the policy rules, especially to the output. 
 
(Insert Figure 5 here.) 
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5.4 A Historical Analysis of China’s monetary policy 
Based on all the experiments we did in the previous section, the best candidates for the 
optimal policy rules are listed in table 8: (chosen from table 6, where both the volatilities of 
the money supply and exchange rate are less than the historical ones)  
 
(Insert Table 8 here.) 
 
Suppose the central bank gives an equal weight to the output gap and the inflation rate, i.e.   
a =1. In figure 6,7 and 8, we plot the money supply, inflation and output gap determined by 
the optimal policy rule and their corresponding actual levels.  
 
Note that the optimal yearly growth rate of money supply is between 15-20% during the 
period of 95.1
8-96.4, while the actual growth rates of money supply lie between 20-30%. In 
the same period, the inflation rates with the optimal policy rule fall to the vicinity of target 
level (3%) in four quarters while the actual inflation rates drop to the vicinity of target level 
in 9 quarters. It seems that the optimal rule reacts to the inflation more drastically than the 
actual policy adopted. However, this quick restoration of the inflation to the target level 
comes at the cost of a 1%-2% of potential output loss.   
 
We also observe that the optimal growth rates of the money supply return to 20-25% after 
the inflation rates drop to the neighborhood of the target level during the period of 97.1-
2001.4, while the actual growth rates of money supply fluctuate along 15%. This relatively 
low money supply causes 2-3% loss of the potential output during this period. The inflation 
rates even drop below zero during 98.2-99.4 and 2001.4-2002.4.   
 
Since the first quarter of 2002, the actual growth rate of the money supply increases to 18-
20%, which brings the inflation back to the target level. In the meanwhile, the output gap 
jumps to the positive side. However, we already see the signs of overheat of the economy. 
The actual growth rate of money supply is higher than the optimal one by 3-4% in year 
                                                           
8 The numbers after the years denote for quarters, i.e., 95.1 means the first quarter of 1995.  
  172003, which results in an inflation of above 3% in 2004. (The actual inflation rates in each 
quarter of year 2004 are 3.33, 5.22,4.1 and 2.73 respectively.)   
 




This paper has applied the stochastic simulation method to explore the optimal policy rules 
in a stylized economic model of China. We considered different forms of the policy 
reaction function and the loss functions. The results have been reported in the previous 
section. Our findings suggest that the best policy rule for the central bank of China is to 
adjust the growth rate of money supply to the lagged money supply and the deviations of 
the inflation, output gap, and exchange rate from their respective target levels.  
The present results obviously highly depend on the model we used, and a model robust test 
can be done in the future study to see if similar results hold for other models.  
 
We choose money supply as the policy instrument in this study because the growth rate of 
the money supply significantly causes the output change during the time period of 1995:1-
2003:4, while the interest rate does not. However, as we mentioned in section 2, the central 
bank of China has already realized the importance of the interest rate as the policy 
instrument since 1998. We can build up a model using the interest rate as the policy 
instrument in the future study for the time period after 1998, but now we do not have 
enough samples. 
 
Another extension is to study the asymmetric policy rules, which react to the positive 
deviation and the negative deviation of the target variables asymmetrically.    
 
 
Appendix: Data Description 
 
Real GDP  
We choose year 1997 as the base year, i.e. the real GDP is just equal to the nominal GDP in 
1997. For the other years, the quarterly real GDP is calculated using the real quarterly GDP 
  18growth rate. Then, an X-11 seasonal adjustment is applied on the real quarterly GDP data. 
The quarterly nominal GDP levels are obtained from IMF-IFS database 2004. 
 
GDP gap  
The GDP gap is defined as the percentage deviation of real GDP to the potential GDP. 
GDP gap = [(Real GDP – Potential GDP) / Potential GDP] * 100%  
The potential GDP is just the fitted value of the following regression: 
yt  = α + βT + e  
Where yt is the real GDP (seasonal adjusted), T is the time period, and e is the error term.  
 
Real interest rate  
We choose China Inter Bank Offered Rate (CIBOR) as a proxy of the nominal interest rate. 
For the period of 1993-1995, data is collected from Report of Shanghai Inter Bank Offer 
Center.  For the period of 1996-2004, data is collected from Quarterly Report of the 
People’s Bank of China.  Both of them are annualized 7-day interest rate and a moving 
average is computed to obtain the quarterly data.  
 
Real interest rate = Nominal interest rate – Inflation rate   
 
Inflation rate  
We choose the CPI as the measurement of the inflation rate. The quarterly CPIs are 
collected from IMF-IFS database 2004. The base of each quarter’s CPI is the same quarter 
of last year. The inflation is then calculated as:  
Inflation = [(CPI –100)/100] * 100% 
 
Exchange rate and money supply 
Real Effective Exchange Rate is collected from IMF-IFS database 2004. Note that an 
increase of the index indicates an appreciation of Chinese Currency RMB. M2 (M1+ quasi-
money) is chosen to measure the money supply. The data is also collected from IMF-IFS 
database 2004. 
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  20Table 1: Granger causality Wald tests 
 chi2  df  Prob>  chi2 
Interest rate causes GDPgap  1.3038  2  0.5211 
Money supply causes GDPgap  5.6368  2  0.0597 
Note: Null hypothesis is interest rate or money supply does not granger 
cause GDP gap. We reject the null hypothesis that money supply does not 
granger cause GDP gap at  10% significance level. 
 
 
Table 2:  Historical volatilities  
  Output Inflation Exchange  rate Money  supply 
Volatility 4.11  35.35  0.004  23.75 
 
 
Table 3:  mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1  
  γ  δ  φ  ρ  MSD(y)M S D ( π)M S D ( e)V a r ( m) Loss Actual 
Loss 
a =0 0.91  0.14  -3.12  0.30 0.32 1.76 1.27  2.68  0.32  1 
a =0.25  0.86  0.07  -2.86  0.45 0.35  1.46  1.08  2.21  0.72  1.25 
a =0.5  0.83  0.02  -2.74  0.56 0.42  1.28  0.96  1.92  1.06  1.5 
a  =1  0.77 -0.07 -2.55 0.75 0.57  1.06  0.82  1.60  1.64  2 
a =1.5 0.72 -0.14 -2.43 0.90 0.72 0.95 0.74 1.46 2.14 2.5
a =2 0.68 -0.20 -2.35 1.02 0.84 0.88 0.70 1.39 2.59 3
a =3  0.62 -0.29 -2.25 1.21 1.03  0.80  0.66  1.37  3.43  4 
a =4  0.58 -0.35 -2.18 1.34 1.17  0.76  0.65  1.41  4.20  5 
a  =10  0.47 -0.55 -1.96 1.69 1.56  0.69  0.69  1.69  8.49  11 
a =1000 0.36 -0.80 -1.70 2.00 2.03  0.67  0.84  2.34  673.9  1001 
 
Table 4:  mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1 (ρ = 0) 
  γ  δ  φ  ρ  MSD(y)M S D ( π)M S D ( e)V a r ( m) Loss Actual 
Loss 
a =0 0.95  0.13  -3.10  0  0.34 1.84 1.42  3.09  0.34  1 
a =0.25  0.93  0.07  -2.95  0  0.37  1.57  1.28  2.74  0.76  1.25 
a =0.5  0.91  0.01  -2.83  0  0.43  1.39  1.19  2.52  1.13  1.5 
a =1  0.89  -0.07  -2.64  0  0.57  1.20  1.08  2.29  1.77  2 
a =1.5  0.87  -0.13  -2.53  0  0.70  1.09  1.03  2.20  2.34  2.5 
a =2  0.86  -0.17  -2.47  0  0.81  1.03  1.00  2.17  2.87  3 
a =3 0.84 -0.23 -2.41 0 0.96 0.98 0.98 2.18 3.85 4
a =4 0.82  -0.27  -2.40  0  1.11 0.92 0.99  2.24  4.79  5 
a =10  0.76  -0.41  -2.48  0  1.52  0.85  1.08  2.67  10.05  11 







  21Table 5:  mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1 (ρ = 0, γ = 0) 
  γ  δ  φ  ρ  MSD(y)M S D ( π)M S D ( e)V a r ( m) Loss Actual 
Loss 
a =0 0  0.55  -4.15  0  2.66  1.54  1.20  1.95  2.66  1 
a =0.25  0  0.48  -4.11  0  2.67  1.50  1.17  1.91  3.04  1.25 
a =0.5  0  0.42  -4.07  0  2.68  1.47  1.15  1.89  3.42  1.5 
a =1  0  0.35  -3.99  0  2.70  1.44  1.13  1.87  4.14  2 
a =1.5  0  0.29  -3.92  0  2.73  1.42  1.10  1.85  4.86  2.5 
a =2  0  0.24  -3.86  0  2.76  1.40  1.09  1.84  5.56  3 
a =3  0  0.16  -3.73  0  2.83  1.37  1.07  1.85  6.94  4 
a =4 0  0.08  -3.61  0  2.89  1.35  1.06  1.87  8.31  5 
a  =10  0 -0.21  -3.17 0  3.19  1.31  1.08  2.17  16.25  11 
a =1000 0 -0.60  -2.60 0  3.68  1.28  1.25  2.99 1288 1001 
 
Table 6: Consider the volatility of the money supply in the loss function  
 mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1  (c = 0.5) 
  γ  δ  φ  ρ  MSD(y)M S D ( π)M S D ( e)V a r ( m) Loss Actual 
Loss 
a =0 0.67  0.10  -2.16  1.43 0.63 1.23 0.68  1.03  1.14  1.5 
a =0.25  0.65  0.07  -2.11  1.41 0.68  1.12  0.65  0.95  1.43  1.75 
a =0.5  0.63  0.04  -2.07  1.40 0.74  1.05  0.62  0.89  1.70  2 
a =1 0.60 -0.01 -2.00 1.41 0.84 0.95 0.58 0.82 2.20 2.5
a =1.5 0.58 -0.05 -1.95 1.43 0.93 0.89 0.56 0.78 2.66 3
a =2 0.56 -0.09 -1.92 1.46 1.00 0.86 0.54 0.76 3.10 3.5
a  =3  0.53 -0.15 -1.87 1.52 1.12  0.81  0.52  0.77  3.93  4.5 
a =4  0.51 -0.20 -1.84 1.57 1.21  0.78  0.51  0.80  4.72  5.5 
a  =10  0.44 -0.39 -1.76 1.76 1.49  0.71  0.53  1.05  9.15  11.5 
a =1000 0.36 -0.80 -1.70 2.00 2.02  0.67  0.84  2.31  675.1 1001.5
 
Table 7: Consider the volatility of the money supply in the loss function 
mt = γmt-1 + δ(πt-1 – π*) + φyt-1 + ρet-1  (b = 2 , c = 0.5) 
 
  γ  δ  φ  ρ  MSD(y)M S D ( π)M S D ( e)V a r ( m) Loss Actual 
Loss 
a =0  0.47 -0.08 -1.61 2.74 1.12  1.20  0.39  0.47  2.15  3.5 
a  =0.25  0.47 -0.09 -1.59 2.55 1.12  1.08  0.40  0.48  2.43  3.75 
a  =0.5  0.46 -0.10 -1.58 2.41 1.13  1.01  0.41  0.48  2.69  4 
a  =1  0.46 -0.12 -1.56 2.25 1.17  0.92  0.42  0.49  3.17  4.5 
a =1.5  0.45  -0.14  -1.55  2.15 1.21  0.87  0.42  0.51  3.62  5 
a =2  0.45  -0.15  -1.55  2.09 1.25  0.84  0.43  0.52  4.05  5.5 
a  =3  0.44 -0.19 -1.55 2.02 1.32  0.80  0.43  0.56  4.87  6.5 
a =4  0.43 -0.22 -1.55 1.99 1.36  0.78  0.44  0.60  5.66  7.5 
a  =10  0.40 -0.35 -1.57 1.95 1.53  0.73  0.47  0.82  10.15  13.5 
a =1000 0.36 -0.79 -1.69 2.01 2.02  0.67  0.83  2.28  676.8 1003.5
 
Table 8 Candidates for optimal policy rules 
  γ  δ  φ  ρ  MSD(y) MSD(π) MSD(e) Var(m) Loss Actual 
Loss 
a =1  0.60 -0.01 -2.00 1.41 0.84  0.95  0.58  0.82  2.20  2.5 
a =1.5  0.58 -0.05 -1.95 1.43 0.93  0.89  0.56  0.78  2.66  3 
a =2  0.56 -0.09 -1.92 1.46 1.00  0.86  0.54  0.76  3.10  3.5 










1994.1 1995.3 1997.1 1998.3 2000.1 2001.3 2003.1 2004.3
Year
%
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